Confronting Obstacles to the Development of a Post-Genocidal Society and State in Bosnia and Herzegovina
David Pettigrew, Ph.D.,
Professor of Philosophy and Holocaust and Genocide Studies, Southern Connecticut State University,
Member, Steering Committee, Yale University Genocide Studies Program
A Presentation for KRUG 99, Sarajevo
June 30, 2019
Any society recovering from genocide and
other war crimes can be assumed to be quite fragile. Special care would need to
be given to issues related to supporting and protecting survivors, honoring the
memory of the victims, pursuing restorative justice, and facilitating
state-building. However, Bosnia and Herzegovina has been facing numerous
obstacles that are destabilizing the nation and the region. Obstacles such as
genocide denial, the glorification of convicted war criminals, hate speech, and
threats of secession prevent the crucial process of healing and state building
in a post-genocidal society. The failure of the international community to
address these obstacles has enabled Republika Srpska to continue to pursue its
founding genocidal goal of ethnic homogeneity.
The
current High Representative, the primary representative of the international
community in Bosnia who has been in the office for about ten years, has also
failed to respond effectively to the deepening crisis. The High
Representative's regular reports to the United Nations Security Council have
clearly itemized his concerns about actions and statements in Republika Srpska
that threaten the peace. In his most recent report to the U.N. Security
Council, on April 17, 2019, the High Representative expressed concern about a
number of negative developments, including challenges
to “the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Bosnia and Herzegovina,
the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidency member Milorad Dodik being again the most
frequent exponent of such proclamations.”1 The High
Representative further specified that “certain officials from the
Republika Srpska continued to make frequent statements denying the statehood of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, while advocating for the secession of the Republika
Srpska and a union with Serbia, saying for instance that the Republika Srpska
is ‘already separated’.”2 The High Representative also expressed
concern that “Senior political figures in the Republika Srpska continue to
deny and belittle the genocide committed in Srebrenica…and to reject the
verdicts and findings of international courts in war crimes cases.”3
Moreover, he lamented the fact that “Republika Srpska appointed
commissions to reopen the interpretation of events in Srebrenica and Sarajevo
from 1992 to 1995, commissions that will, according to the High Representative,
detract from progress for “justice and reconciliation.”4
The High Representative referred ominously in his report to changes to the Law on Police and Internal
Affairs in Republika Srpska that creates a reserve police force: “In
April, the Republika Srpka National Assembly moved forward with legislation to
create a reserve police force…This move, interpreted by some as an attempt to
build an alternative military force, raised grave concerns in the Federation.
…The issue has also been seen in the light of the previous controversy over
the disproportionate purchases of long-barrel weapons by the RS police.”5
The High Representative explained that a member of the main board of the ruling
party in Republika Srpska wrote that the reserve police is “a replacement for
the Army of Republika Srpska.” The High Representative, emphasized that
the situation “does not contribute to peace and stability in Bosnia and
Herzegovina.”6 He expressed concern that, in spite of the fact
that Annex 7 of the Peace Agreement guarantees the right of return, “Recent
incidents have undermined the confidence of returnees to areas where their
ethnic group represents a numerical minority.” He was recalling the fact
that on March 10, “the Ravna Gora Serb ultra-nationalist Chetnik movement
…held its annual gathering in the Višegrad area, most wearing black uniforms
and insignia similar to uniforms worn by Serb paramilitaries in the
1990s.”7 The High Representative reported that “Republika Srpska
continues to refuse to adhere to judgments of the Constitutional Court and the
Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina concerning the registration of defense
property,”8 and he warned of
totalitarian developments in Republika Srpska, indicating that Milorad Dodik
claimed that “changes and amendments to the Republika Srpska Criminal Code
would include a prison sentence of three years or more for those refusing to
respect the decisions of Republika Srpska bodies.”9 These are
all troubling revelations, and certainly no less than an indictment of the
leadership and policies of Republika Srpska, policies that should have
motivated the High Representative and the international community to take
action, but no action has been taken.
But it should also be a matter
of concern that the report from April 2019 looks hauntingly like other reports
to the U.N. since the High Representative's appointment in 2009. In his report from May 21, 2009, the High
Representative stated his concern about “anti-Dayton rhetoric challenging the
sovereignty, territorial integrity, and constitutional order of the
country” and mentioned that “Republika Srpska officials and
institutions took steps and issued statements furthering the idea of eventual
secession of the Republika Srpska from Bosnia and Herzegovina.”10
In his October 31, 2012 report, three years later, the High Representative
expressed concern that “Statements uttered by senior RS figures, as well
as actions initiated by them to erode the competencies of the state, raise
profound doubts about the commitment of the current RS leadership to the most
fundamental aspect of Dayton – the sovereignty and territorial integrity of
BiH. This issue of open and growing advocacy for the dissolution of Bosnia and
Herzegovina by officials from the Republika Srpska, first and foremost by the
entity’s President Milorad Dodik, is one which I believe deserves the special
attention of the international community.”11 In
2016, approaching the 21st anniversary of the Dayton Accords the High
Representative expressed numerous concerns about negative developments in
Republika Srpska “with political and legal
consequences detrimental to the stability of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”12
In addition to his reports to the U.N., the High Representative has regularly commented in the press on similar concerns regarding certain developments or the behavior of politicians in the RS.13 In February 2018, the High Representative expressed concern that 2,500 weapons had been sold to Republika Srpska.14 In addition, the High Representative or his office responded sharply to the tweets from Rajko Vasić, condemning Vasić's genocide denial and hate speech: “Specifically, the statement made by Rajko Vasić, SNSD Main Board member, on the Srebrenica genocide…goes far beyond a denial. … it threatens violence. And not any violence. It threatens genocide. … The High Representative urges the competent judicial bodies to promptly react.”15
Hence, in
his reports to the U.N., and in his statements to the media, the High
Representative has clearly identified threats
to the peace originating in Republika Srpska, but he has not responded
effectively to those threats. What is the point of stating that something
deserves the special attention of the international community if no action is
to be taken?
In his reports, the High Representative
often justifies his decision not to use his “BONN Powers,” or
“executive powers” to oversee the peace in the following way:
“… I continue to refrain from using executive powers, in accordance with
the policy of the Peace Implementation Council Steering Board emphasizing
“local ownership” over international decision-making.”16 Since
2009, the vast majority of the reports include this same explanation. In a few
cases, decisions were actually made to remove
bans on certain politicians that had been imposed by previous High
Representatives.17 But the so-called BONN powers, which were provided precisely so that the High
Representative would be able to respond to an intolerable or impossible
situation in which ultranationalists are undermining the possibility of
progress toward peace, justice, and reconciliation, were
effectively suspended in 2006.18 Even in the limited cases
where the High Representative would issue special reports regarding Republika
Srpska's direct violation of the General Framework Agreement for Peace, these
would be “interpretations” rather than decisions.19 This
is attested to by the fact that after such a special report, on a matter of
grave concern, the High Representative would state in his regular report to the
U.N. that no executive decisions had been made during the reporting period.20
But with this pronouncement that he will not
wield his BONN Powers, it seems that the High Representative is operating
within the confines of a false dilemma. This is a “false dilemma” in
the sense that the High Representative seems to be arguing that either he would use his executive powers
or he would have to do nothing. This
is a logical fallacy that dooms the Office of the High Representative to
paralysis. There are, arguably, other options that could be pursued apart from
those two alternatives. There are other initiatives that could have been taken
in the last decade, apart from the exercise of executive powers, which could
have involved diplomatic communications and sanctions. There have been a myriad of socially
destructive initiatives in Republika Srpska–threats to the peace–that should
have received a more concrete public responses and actions. These threats to
the peace have included the construction of Serbian orthodox churches in Muslim
villages. The Churches are part of an orchestrated campaign of psychological
intimidation designed to prevent refugee return to the homes and communities
from which they were forcibly expelled. Another threat to the peace has
involved memorials installed in Republika Srpska to honor and glorify convicted
perpetrators, such as the commemorative plaque on Vraca Hill honoring Ratko
Mladić and the student dormitory named after Radovan Karadžić, both convicted
of genocide and other war crimes and sentenced to life in prison. While
perpetrators are honored, survivors are prohibited or discouraged from
installing memorials in Prijedor, at Omarska, or near Trnopolje. These
glorifications of convicted perpetrators and the prohibition of memorials for
the victims prevent the possibility of reconciliation and healing on the local
level, and present an obstacle to the right of return in Annex 7 of the General
Framework for Peace.21 In each of these threats to the peace the High Representative should have responded
more forcefully with diplomatic initiatives. The High
Representative could
have used his considerable influence and his diplomatic prestige to lobby
United States and European Union officials to impose appropriate sanctions
against Republika Srpska. Such diplomatic
pressure could have facilitated the installation of memorials to the victims in
atrocity sites in Republika Srpska where they are prohibited. It seems
reasonable to expect that the High Representative would respond to these
instances of cultural provocation, oppression, and discrimination by coming to
the defense of the survivors and to the defense of Annex 7. Only in the past
week a provocative plaque referring to “Muslim hordes” was mounted in
Srebrenica22 and a mural glorifying Draža Mihailović was “was put up on a central
building in the eastern Bosnian town of Foča.”23 We must ask in this regard: “What has
the High Representative been waiting for?”
The failure of the office of the
High Representative to take action in the face of these obstacles has been all
the more troubling due to the fact that Bosnia and Herzegovina is a
“post-genocidal society.”24 The priority in a
post-genocidal society, for a leader such as the High Representative, should be
to protect and support the survivors whose loved ones were murdered and who
themselves suffered forcible displacement from their homes. The survivors
continue to endure trauma as a result of their direct experience, or through trans-generational
trauma. The survivors of a genocide are a highly vulnerable group that should
be protected from psychological harm and re-traumatization.25
However, in Bosnia, due to the inaction of the High Representative, survivors
are assaulted psychologically, on a daily basis, by reminders of the genocide.
The founding genocidal project of Republika Sprska lives on in the cultural
practices of genocide denial the glorification of convicted war criminals, hate
speech, and the prohibition of memorials for the victims, all tactics designed
to prevent non-Serbs from returning to their former homes from which they were
forcibly expelled and hate speech. Such a “cultural genocide” is a
form of genocide to which Raphael Lemkin alluded in 1944.26 In
response to this cultural genocide, diplomatic action should have facilitated
the installation of memorials for the victims in places where, as in the case
of Srebrenica, the atrocities have been judged to be war crimes, crimes
committed as part of one or more Joint Criminal Enterprises to render Republika
Srpska ethnically homogeneous. The High Representative could have been guided
by the principles that were clearly articulated in the four “executive
decisions” that were taken by three successive High Representatives, in a
coordinated way, over the course of eight years, to establish the
Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery. These executive decisions were
strongly supported by the United States.27 It is relevant to recall
that the decision enacting the Law in June 2007, followed the International
Court of Justice judgment, that genocide had occurred in Srebrenica, by four
months. The principles to which I refer, included the establishment of a
memorial to achieve “reconciliation”
that would “promote the return of displaced persons and refugees and
permanent peace,”28 and more pointedly, “the observance of
human rights and the protection of refugees and displaced persons.”29
Moreover, the High Representatives’ decisions from 2000 to 2007, asserted the
importance of recognizing “the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of each
and every human being.”30 Finally it is crucial to note that
the successive decisions surrounding Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial and Cemetery
articulated the importance of establishing a memorial in a “solemn
place.”31 In other words, the cemetery and memorial were
established in Potočari, and the Battery Factory was incorporated into the
memorial, because this was a place where atrocities took place, a place with
meaning for the survivors, the place where many saw their loved ones for the
last time. Following the establishment of Srebrenica-Potočari Memorial Center
and Cemetery, the current High Representative, during his tenure, could have
followed the example of his predecessors, and could well have expanded this
vision of “the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of
each and every human being” by establishing memorials in Omarska,
Prijedor, Trnopolje, Foča, Višegrad, and other solemn places of pain.32
The failure of the High
Representative to respond decisively to the prohibition of memorials for the
victims in Republika Srpska has facilitated cultural genocide. It is important
to note that, in this way–through cultural genocide–the founding genocidal
impulse of Republika Srpska actually continues to haunt the survivors. In this
sense, then, Bosnia and Herzegovina is not simply “post-genocidal,”
but rather is plagued by a continuation of
the founding genocidal intention of Republika Srpska. The inaction of the High
Representative and of
the international community has allowed this genocidal culture, replete with
nationalistic and fascistic tendencies, to continue to flourish in Republika
Srpska. We should therefore ask again: “What has the High Representative
been waiting for?” If the High Representative has been willing to render
decisions lifting bans on politicians that were imposed by his predecessors,
could he not also render decisions lifting the “bans” in Republika
Srpska that prohibit the installation of memorials for the victims of genocide?
An even greater tragedy of
the High Representative's inaction is that all of the aspects of the
continuation of the genocide embedded in the culture of Republika Srpska are at
the same time classical predictors of a genocide to come; predictors of another
genocide against non-Serbs in Bosnia. Genocide denial, especially from the
leadership of Republika Srpska and Serbia condones the atrocities that were
committed. The glorification of convicted war criminals suggests that the
atrocities were not crimes but were a heroic public service, even a noble
undertaking, thereby threatening future atrocities. This reminds us of the law in Republika
Srpska that established memorials for the heroes of the “war of
liberation”. In other words, it was not a genocide, it was a
“liberation”! The memorial to the perpetrators in Visegrad that is
visited by the Ravno Gorski Pokret, refers to the “brave defenders of
Republika Srpska”. So it was not a genocide, it was a
“defense”! For a genocide
survivor, denial and the glorification of convicted war criminals constitute
hate speech. When President Dodik claimed that Muslims were re-occupying the
Podrinje, this was dehumanizing hate speech.33 When Rajko Vasić
threatened another genocide, this was hate speech and the High Representative himself
referred to it as a criminal offense.
A friend asked me recently:
“Do you think things are getting worse in Bosnia?” But looking back
after the recognition of Republika Srpska in 1995, a recognition that was a
legitimation of the genocidal crimes through which it was brought into
existence, and recognizing the continuation of the strategies of dehumanization
and exclusion in Republika Srpska, I wonder if it possible to say that things
have ever improved? There has been, rather, a continuation of the genocide,
since 1995, in the socio-cultural policies and practices of Republika Srpska, a
continuation that lays the foundation for another genocide. Hence, Bosnia
remains suspended, as it were, in an impossible threshold between the
continuation of the genocide, through cultural and political means, and the
threat of the onset of another genocide.
I would
like to conclude by recalling a comment by political thinker, Hannah Arendt,
who fled Europe with her husband in 1941 with the assistance of Varian Fry, an
American who managed the Emergency Rescue Committee in Marseille, an operation
that later became the International Rescue Committee that we know today. In an article published in 1945, Arendt
reflected on Germans who, after the Shoah, declared that they were
“ashamed of being Germans.”34 But Arendt's response to
this sentiment was that she was “ashamed of being human” (Ibid). The
idea of humanity she writes, entails that “in one form or another, humans
must assume responsibility for all crimes committed by humans and that all
nations share the onus of evil committed by others” (Ibid.). And thus the
international community must confront its shame for its failure to assume its
responsibility to respond to hate speech, genocide denial, threats of secession
and to the entrenchment of Serbia ultra-nationalism that is destabilizing the
country and the region, a nationalism that has inspired terrorist attacks
against Muslims in Europe. Once again, we must ask, “What is the High
Representative waiting for?”
Notes
1. “55th Report of the High
Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on BiH to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations,” OHR, 8 May, 2019, http://www.ohr.int/?p=100919. It
was Mr. Inzko's “21st regular report to the UN Secretary-General
since assuming the post of High Representative for BiH in 2009.”
2. “Summary,” “55th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on BiH to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,” OHR, 8 May, 2019, http://www.ohr.int/?p=100919
3.”D. Challenges to the General Framework Agreement for Peace, Rhetoric on War Crimes,”
“55th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on BiH to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,” OHR, 8 May, 2019, http://www.ohr.int/?p=100919
4.”Summary,” “55th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the
Peace Agreement on BiH to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,”
OHR, 8 May, 2019, http://www.ohr.int/?p=100919
5. “Detailed Report Presented By The High Representative Valentin Inzko to the UN Security Council,” SarajevoTimes, 10 May, 2019, http://www.sarajevotimes.com/detailed-report-presented-by-the-high-representative-valentin-inzko-to-the-un-security-council/ Also see, “Remarks by High Representative Valentin Inzko to the United Nations Security Council,” OHR 8 May 2019, http://www.ohr.int/?p=100943 . The Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council also expressed its concern: “The disproportionate purchases of long-barrelled weapons by some law enforcement agencies has raised concern.” “Communiqué of the Steering Board of the Peace Implementation Council” OHR, 6 June, 2018, http://www.ohr.int/?p=99545
6. “Remarks by High Representative Valentin Inzko to the United Nations Security Council,” OHR 8 May 2019, http://www.ohr.int/?p=100943
7. IX. Return of Refugees and Displaced Persons, “55th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on BiH to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,” OHR, 8 May, 2019, http://www.ohr.int/?p=100919.
8. “II. Political Update, A. General Political Environment,” 55th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace
Agreement on BiH to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,” OHR, 8
May, 2019, http://www.ohr.int/?p=100919.
9.
“V. Republika Srpska,” 55th Report of
the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on BiH to the
Secretary-General of the United Nations, OHR, 8 May, 2019, http://www.ohr.int/?p=100919.
10. 35th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, OHR 22 November, 2009, http://www.ohr.int/?p=35967
11. 42nd Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, OHR, 8 November, 2012, (my emphasis), http://www.ohr.int/?p=32530. November 16, 2012, in an address to Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Mr. Inzko stated that Inzko quoted the (then) President of Republika Sprska Milorad Dodik, “Bosnia and Herzegovina is a rotten state that does not deserve to exist”, and “Bosnia and Herzegovina is definitely falling apart and it will happen sooner or later. As far as I am concerned, I hope to God it dissolves as soon as possible.” Ambassador Inzko warned that President Dodik's remarks should not be ignored and that it would be a mistake to dismiss his words as empty or election-driven rhetoric because they threaten the peace and stability of BiH. https://www.acbih.org/ambassador-valentin-inzkos-warning-at-the-un-security-council/
12. Fiftieth report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, 28 October 2016, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2016_911.pdf
13. On June 3, 2019, an op-ed essay authored by the High Representative addressed concerns about the “rule of law,” in relation to the work of the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council (HJPC) and the BiH Prosecutor’s office. “HJPC: Time to change,”
OHR, 3 June, 2019, http://www.ohr.int/?p=101282.
14. The High Representative stated: “I would like the country to have as few weapons as possible.” “Arms shipment to Bosnian Serbs stokes EU fears,” 13 February, 2018, The Guardian,https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/13/bosnian-serb-police-arms-purchase-stokes-eu-fears
15.“The High Representative condemns in the strongest possible terms recent statements by a number of public figures denying the genocide in Srebrenica, glorifying war crimes and using hate speech and even threats. The genocide committed in Srebrenica is a fact confirmed by two international tribunals,” the OHR said “OHR condemns RS entity's denial of Srebrenica genocide,”NI, http://rs.n1info.com/English/NEWS/a403213/OHR-and-US-embassy-in-Sarajevo-condemn-Bosnian-Serb-official-s-statement-on-Srebrenica-genocide.html
16. II. Political Update, B. Decisions of the High Representative during the Reporting Period,” “55th Report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on BiH to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,” OHR, 8 May, 2019, http://www.ohr.int/?p=100919.
17. See for example, “High Representative decisions during the reporting period, §20,” Thirty-Eighth Report of the High Representative, OHR, 21 October, 2010, http://www.ohr.int/ohr-info/pdf/38th_report.pdf. The High Representative lifted bans, for example, “on persons previously barred from being candidates for elections and from holding any executive office at any level due to obstruction of the General Framework for Peace.”
18. Annex 10 Article V: Final Authority to Interpret, The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Initialed in Dayton on 21 November 1995 and signed in Paris on 14 December 1995, OHR, http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=1252.
“The High Representative is the final authority in theater regarding interpretation of this
Agreement
on the civilian implementation of the peace settlement.” http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=63269. Also see Article XI. 2, of the Peace Implementation Council
BONN Conclusions: “The
Council welcomes the High Representative’s intention to use his final authority
in theatre regarding interpretation of the Agreement on the Civilian Implementation
of the Peace Settlement in order to facilitate the resolution of difficulties
by making binding decisions, as he judges necessary, on the following issues: a.
timing, location and chairmanship of meetings of
the common institutions; b. interim measures
to take effect when parties are unable to reach agreement, which will remain in
force until the Presidency or Council of Ministers has adopted a decision
consistent with the Peace Agreement on the issue concerned; c. other measures to ensure
implementation of the Peace Agreement throughout Bosnia and Herzegovina and
its Entities, as well as the smooth running of the common institutions. Such
measures may include actions against persons holding public office or officials
who are absent from meetings without good cause or who are found by the High
Representative to be in violation of legal commitments made under the Peace Agreement or the terms for its
implementation.” OHR, 12 December 2007, http://www.ohr.int/?p=54137#11
19.
Special Report on a Referendum in Republika Srpska against Bosnia and
Herzegovina State Constitutional Court Decisions, OHR, 21 October, 2016, http://www.ohr.int/?p=96479
20. “B. Decisions of the High Representative During the Reporting Period: Despite serious challenges to the constitutional order of BiH and the GFAP during the reporting period, I continued to refrain from using my executive powers in line with the PIC Steering Board’s policy of emphasizing “local ownership” over international decision-making.”
Fiftieth report of the High Representative for Implementation of the Peace Agreement on Bosnia and Herzegovina, OHR, 28 October 2016, http://www.ohr.int/?p=96460
21. Annex 7, Agreement on Refugees and Displaced Persons, The General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, OHR, http://www.ohr.int/?page_id=63261
22. Mladen Lakic, “Plaque Commemorating Killed
Serbs in Srebrenica Sparks Dispute,” BalkanInsight, 19 June, 2019. The inscription on the plaque
says it is “in memory of the innocently killed Serbs of the Podrinje and Birac
area in the period 1992-1995, committed by Muslim hordes”.
23. Mural glorifying Chetnik leader appears
in Foca, victims’ associations react, N1 Sarajevo,
25 June, 2019, http://ba.n1info.com/English/NEWS/a352225/Mural-glorifying-Chetnik-leader-appears-in-Foca-victims-associations-react.html
24.
Prosecutions have lead to convictions for Genocide in Srebrenica, and other for
war crimes throughout the territory of Republika Srpska and in Sarajevo. While neither Karadzić or Mladić were
convicted of genocide for Count 1 in the Municipalities, the indictments and
the Statements of Republika Srpska's own leaders indicated that the plan was to
render the territory of Republika Srpska ethnically homogeneous. As I have
argued in the past, the recognition of Republika Srpska at Dayton was a reward
for a successful genocide.
25.
Supporting and protecting the
survivors would require concrete efforts to achieve restorative or reparative
justice, as part of which Republika Srpska would need to take responsibility
for its crimes. Only in this way can justice and reconciliation can be
possible.
26. “Generally speaking, genocide does not necessarily mean the immediate destruction of a nation, except when accomplished by mass killings of all members of a nation. It is intended rather to signify a coordinated plan of different actions aiming at the destruction of essential foundations of the life of national groups, with the aim of annihilating the groups themselves. The objectives of such a plan would be disintegration of the political and social institutions, of culture, language, national feelings, religion, and the economic existence of national groups, and the destruction of the personal security, liberty, health, dignity, and even the lives of the individuals belonging to such groups. Genocide is directed against the national group as an entity, and the actions involved are directed against individuals, not in their individual capacity, but as members of the national group…. Genocide has two phases: one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor. This imposition, in turn, may be made upon the oppressed population which is allowed to remain or upon the territory alone, after removal of the population and the colonization by the oppressor's own nationals.” Raphael Lemkin, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe: Analysis, Proposals for Redress, (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1944), p. 79.
27. The decisions were: Wolfgang
Petritsch High Representative, “Decision on the location of a cemetery and a
monument for the victims of Srebrenica,” OHR, 25 October 2000, http://www.ohr.int/?p=67588; Wolfgang
Petritsch High Representative, “Decision establishing and registering the
Foundation of the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery,” OHR, 10 May
2001, http://www.ohr.int/?p=67761; Paddy Ashdown, High Representative, “Decision ordering the transfer of
ownership of the Battery Factory “AS” a.d -Srebrenica to the Foundation of the
Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery and establishing an ad hoc Battery
Factory “AS” a.d.- Srebrenica compensation Commission,” OHR, 25 March
2003, http://www.ohr.int/?p=65883; Dr. Christian Schwarz-Schilling, High
Representative, “Decision Enacting the Law on the center for the
Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of the 1995
Genocide,” OHR, 25 June 2007, http://www.ohr.int/?p=64715
The
enactment of the Law followed the Judgement of the International Court of
Justice that genocide had occurred at Srebrenica: Ҥ297. The Court concludes that the acts committed at
Srebrenica falling within Article II (a) and (b) of the Convention were
committed with the specific intent to destroy in part the group of the Muslims
of Bosnia and Herzegovina as such; and accordingly that these were acts of
genocide, committed by members of the VRS in and around Srebrenica from about
13 July 1995.” Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia
and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007. https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/91/091-20070226-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf
28. Decision establishing and registering the Foundation of the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery, OHR, 2001, http://www.ohr.int/?p=67761; and “Decision Enacting the Law on the Center for the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of the 1995 Genocide,” OHR, 25 June, 2007,
29. “Decision Enacting the Law on
the center for the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of
the 1995 Genocide,” OHR, 25 June 2007, http://www.ohr.int/?p=64715
30. “Decision Enacting the Law on the center for the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery for the Victims of the 1995 Genocide,” OHR, 25 June 2007, http://www.ohr.int/?p=64715
31. “Decision ordering the transfer of ownership of the Battery Factory “AS” a.d -Srebrenica to the Foundation of the Srebrenica-Potocari Memorial and Cemetery and establishing an ad hoc Battery Factory “AS” a.d.- Srebrenica compensation Commission,” OHR, 25 March 2003, http://www.ohr.int/?p=65883
32. I borrow this phrase–
“places of pain”–from the title of Hariz Halilovich's book, Places of pain: Forced displacement, popular
memory and trans-local identities in Bosnian war-torn communities (New York:
Berghahn, 2013).
33. Igor Spaic, “Bosnian Serb President in ‘Hate Speech’ Probe,” BalkanInsight, 18 July 2017,
34. Hannah Arendt, “Organized Guilt and Universal Responsibility,” The Portable Hannah Arendt, edited by Peter Baehr (New York: Penguin Books, 2000), 154.
